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Abstract 
Studies on the role of the credit channel have flourished in recent years. This paper focuses 
on the work that has been carried out using Swiss data. It begins with some general features 
characterizing the credit channel and demonstrating its empirical implications. It then 
provides an overview of the empirical papers. For the most part, these papers test cross-
sectional implications of the credit view. The overall evidence suggests that a credit channel 
exists but a precise assessment of the effects of monetary policy operating through this 
channel is still a long way off. Much work has yet to be done, not least on the data side, in 
order to obtain a clear view of the quantitative importance of the credit channel for 
Switzerland. 
 
JEL classification: E44, E51, E52 
Keywords: Monetary transmission, credit channel 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Zahl der Untersuchungen zur Rolle des Kreditkanals im monetären 
Transmissionsmechanismus hat in den letzten Jahren stark zugenommen. Dieses Papier 
beschäftigt sich mit den Arbeiten, die mit Schweizer Daten durchgeführt worden sind. Es 
beginnt mit einer kurzen Darstellung des Kreditkanals und seiner empirischen 
Implikationen. Anschliessend gibt es einen Überblick zu den empirischen Papieren. Der 
Grossteil dieser Arbeiten testet Querschnittsimplikationen des Kreditkanals. Die Resultate 
deuten insgesamt darauf hin, dass ein Kreditkanal existiert; von einer präzisen Einschätzung 
der Wirkungen, welche die Geldpolitik auf diesem Wege ausübt, sind wir aber noch weit 
entfernt. Um eine klares Bild der quantitativen Bedeutung des Kreditkanals in der Schweiz 
zu gewinnen, bleibt vor allem auf der Datenseite viel zu tun.  
 
Résumé 
Le nombre d’études traitant du rôle du canal du crédit dans le mécanisme de transmission de 
la politique monétaire a fortement augmenté dans les dernières années. Cet article se 
concentre exclusivement sur les travaux basés sur des données statistiques suisses. Il 
commence par une description succincte des caractéristiques du canal du crédit et de ses 
implications empiriques, et se livre ensuite à un survol de la littérature empirique. La plupart 
de ces travaux testent les implications en coupe transversale du canal du crédit. Les résultats 
obtenus suggèrent l’existence d’un canal du crédit, bien qu’une évaluation précise de la 
façon dont la politique monétaire exercerait un effet par ce biais ne soit pas encore faisable. 
Il reste notamment beaucoup de travail à réaliser du côté des données statistiques pour 
pouvoir évaluer l’importance quantitative du canal du crédit en Suisse. 5 
1.  Introduction 
The standard textbook model of monetary policy is based on the view that the capital 
structures of lenders and borrowers do not affect their real decisions.
1 As a result, the 
economy can be modelled without making any distinction between different forms of 
financing (“money view”). Yet, the irrelevance of the capital structure depends on various 
assumptions which do not always hold in reality. In particular, it takes for granted that all 
financing forms are treated equally with respect to taxes, that securities can be issued 
without transaction costs, that the same information is available to both lenders and 
borrowers, and that conflicts of interest can be resolved without costs.  
Since the 1970s, various authors have examined the consequences of relaxing the 
assumptions underlying the “money view”. Most of them focused on the information 
asymmetries faced by lenders and borrowers. This research has produced the “credit view” 
that distinguishes different forms of financing and hence different financial assets. 
Consequently, whereas the “money view” generally only makes a distinction between non-
interest bearing “money” and interest-bearing “securities”, the credit view subdivides the 
“securities” further (e.g. bank loans, bonds and shares).  
It has become usual to describe the difference between the money view and the credit 
view on the basis of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and to differentiate a 
“money channel” and a “credit channel”. This convention is adopted here, even though it 
would also be possible to work on the assumption of a shock other than a monetary-policy 
one. What happens, then, if the central bank sells government securities on the open market, 
thus bringing about a reduction in the monetary base? In the money view, this action 
produces a rise in the open market interest rate and causes a fall in the demand for credit and 
in output and employment. In the credit view, the same action additionally results in a 
reduction in the credit supply, so that the credit interest rate rises in relation to the open 
market rate. The effects of monetary policy therefore are magnified.  
The credit channel illustrates a possible way in which monetary policy is able to 
influence the economy even if the open market interest rate barely responds. An extreme 
example is where the short-term interest rate controlled by the central bank is zero. In this 
case, the money channel is closed and monetary policy can only take effect through other 
channels, such as the credit channel. Aside from such extreme examples, however, most 
economists tend to see the credit channel as an extension of, rather than an alternative to, the 
money channel. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the two versions of 
the credit channel commonly distinguished in the literature are presented: the balance sheet 
channel and the bank lending channel. Section 3 deals with the empirical literature based on 
Swiss data. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1  See Modigliani and Miller (1958) for the theoretical background of this view. 6 
2.  Forms of the credit channel 
Balance sheet channel 
The source of the credit channel is widely seen in financial market frictions caused by 
information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. The borrower generally knows 
himself and his situation better than the lender. He is better able to judge the chances of his 
investment project being successful, and to some extent also influences these chances by his 
own behaviour. This asymmetry gives rise to a premium for all forms of external financing.  
Expressed in rather more technical terms, the lender-borrower relationship is 
determined by a principal-agent problem, whereby the lender is the principal and the 
borrower the agent. This gives rise to the usual problems of “adverse selection” and “moral 
hazard”, which drive a wedge between the cost of external and internal funds.
2 Financing an 
investment project from external funds is more expensive than financing it from retained 
profits. The difference reflects the premium for external financing. 
The premium depends primarily on the borrower’s financial situation. The lower the 
borrower’s net worth, the less security he can offer the lender and the higher the premium 
on the external funding. Moreover, the lower his cash flow, the smaller the proportion of the 
investment he is able to finance with internal funds and the higher again the premium on the 
external funding. These interactions are of particular relevance to the central bank if 
monetary policy is able to influence the net worth and the cash flow. Advocates of the credit 
channel argue that it is able to do both. A restrictive monetary policy reduces the value of 
collateralisable assets and thereby reduces the borrower’s net worth. At the same time, it 
weakens aggregate demand, the decline being reflected in lower cash flow.  
This completes the “balance sheet channel”. A tightening of monetary policy leads to 
a deterioration of the borrowers’ balance sheets. Information costs rise and the premium 
demanded for external financing grows. The increase in credit interest exceeds the rise in 
the default-risk-free rate associated with the monetary policy tightening. Consequently, the 
effects on credit and the real economy are amplified. 
It should be borne in mind that the credit channel, as we have described it here, does 
not imply any credit rationing. Its effect is exerted purely through interest rates. Of course 
there is also the possibility that the lenders may react to the information problems by 
rationing credit instead of raising credit interest, especially if they fear that the higher 
interest rates will increasingly attract only the poor credit risks (adverse selection). In other 
words, the credit channel can exist either with or without credit rationing.  
                                                 
2  “Adverse selection” refers to the incentive to look for outside funds for financing risky investment 
projects, while “moral hazard” refers to the incentive for those with externally financed investments to 
enter into major risks and not repay their loans. Adverse selection thus relates to the situation prior to the 
signing of a credit agreement, and moral hazard to the post-signing situation. 7 
Bank lending channel 
Banks have not played a specific role so far. It actually would be true to say that the 
balance sheet channel could even exist in a world without banks. The idea of the balance 
sheet channel is based on the balance sheet of the borrower, i.e. generally a firm or a 
household. If the balance sheet deteriorates, the premium for external financing rises. 
Whether or not the credit comes from a bank does not matter.  
However, banks also have to finance their activities. The arguments regarding the 
balance sheet channel thus also apply to the banks. If a bank’s balance sheet worsens 
following a tightening of monetary policy, it generally becomes more difficult for the bank 
to procure sufficient external resources to continue its lending activities as before. If the 
bank is unable or unwilling to adjust its balance sheet purely by reducing its portfolio of 
securities, it will have to cut back its lending activities. In this way, the money channel and 
balance sheet channel of monetary policy may be augmented by a “bank lending channel”.  
It is important to note that the reduction in the banks' supply of credit will only affect 
the economy if at least some of the borrowers are unable to resort to other sources of 
funding. In practice, this condition is unquestionably met. Only large companies have the 
option of procuring funds from the capital market. For small firms and households, banks 
are generally the only source of external financing. 
 
Empirical issues 
The attempt to pin down the existence of a credit channel empirically is rather a 
difficult undertaking. The main reason for this difficulty is the fact that most variables move 
in the same direction after a monetary policy shock, regardless of the existence of a credit 
channel. A tightening of monetary policy can cause the credit volume to decline through a 
money channel or through a credit channel. In the former case, the fall in demand for credit 
caused by the higher open market interest rate is responsible for the drop in the credit 
volume, whereas in the latter case the decline in the supply of credit is responsible. 
At first glance, the situation looks much the same with regard to interest rates. When 
rates rise after a tightening of monetary policy, this is consistent both with a money channel 
and a credit channel. But we have seen that – in the presence of a credit channel – credit 
interest rates probably raise faster than the default-risk-free interest rate. This suggests that 
interest rate spreads may help us to identify the credit channel. Unfortunately, such an 
approach places heavy demands on the data, which are hardly ever met. There is no 
secondary market for most forms of credit, for example. Moreover, two general points must 
be borne in mind. First, a tightening of monetary policy dampens economic growth and thus 
increases the probability of bankruptcies. Consequently, the spread between the credit 
interest rate and the default-risk-free rate widens even in the absence of asymmetric 
information. In this case, movements in the interest rate spread will indicate a credit channel 
even though amplification of the impact of the higher bankruptcy risk by asymmetric 
information – the crux of the credit channel – is absent. Secondly, there is the possibility of 8 
credit rationing. If the lenders react to the tightening of monetary policy by rationing credit, 
the spread between credit and default-risk-free interest can remain unchanged. In this 
instance, a credit channel exists without this being evident from the interest rate spread. 
Owing to the difficulty of identifying the credit channel with the aid of aggregate time 
series data, a large portion of the recent empirical literature has focused on the cross-
sectional implications of the credit view. For example, the credit view suggests that a 
tightening of monetary policy should have disproportionally strong consequences for small, 
less liquid and poorly capitalised borrowers. They are expected to feel the brunt of the 
growing difficulty to finance themselves with external funds. The credit view thus predicts 
that monetary policy has distributive effects across companies (balance sheet channel) and 
across banks (bank lending channel). These predictions can be tested by cross-sectional 
analyses. 9 
3.  Empirical studies with Swiss credit data 
This section reviews the empirical studies performed in recent years with Swiss credit 
data. We ignore the older literature, which consistently used aggregate data and failed 
because of the identification problem (cf. Hofmann, 1994, and the literature cited therein). 
We also ignore the literature that deals with the information content of credit variables (cf. 
Jordan, 1999). These studies generally find that credit variables may improve the inflation 
forecast. They are thus useful for monetary policy, but they do not tell us anything about the 
transmission mechanism and cannot provide an answer to the question of whether a credit 
channel exists or not. 
As a starting point for our discussion of the literature, we take the influential empirical 
study by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), which focuses on the transmission of monetary 
impulses in the United States. In this study, the two authors estimate VAR models to 
investigate the timing relationship between monetary policy actions and bank lending. Data 
are monthly and the sample covers the period 1959-1978. The implied impulse-response 
functions show that a tightening of monetary policy, as reflected by a positive innovation to 
the Federal Funds rate, is followed by an immediate decline in bank deposits and in bank 
holdings of securities. Bank lending hardly responds at first. Only six to nine months after 
the shock, the bank loans start to decline, whereas the securities holdings are rebuilt 
gradually and unemployment begins to rise. 
This pattern suggests that the banks use their securities portfolio as a buffer and only 
gradually adjust their credit portfolio following the decline in deposits. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with a credit channel story. But as Bernanke and Blinder 
themselves point out, other interpretations cannot be ruled out. In particular, it can still be 
argued that the decline in bank lending solely reflects the effect of monetary policy on the 
demand for credit. 
In his study of Swiss data, Natal (2002, 2003) extends the approach taken by 
Bernanke and Blinder in three directions. For one thing, the model is estimated with 
Bayesian methods so that a relatively large VAR can be used in spite of rather short time 
series. For another, monetary policy shocks are identified while taking due account of the 
special role played by the exchange rate and international factors in a small open economy 
like Switzerland’s. And finally, the spread between the mortgage rate and the yield on 
Confederation bonds is used as a proxy for the external finance premium. This spread is not 
ideal, but data availability precludes a more appropriate measure of the premium. Overall, 
the model has a total of 13 variables.
3 The data are monthly and cover the period 1976-2002. 
The impulse-response functions of the estimated model exhibit the pattern familiar 
from Bernanke and Blinder (1992). Following a tightening of monetary policy, the money 
                                                 
3  The set of foreign variables includes the oil price, German industrial production, German producer prices 
and the German 3-month interest rate. The Swiss variables are the 3-month Swiss franc interest rate, M2 
money stock, the securities holdings of the big banks, total bank credits, the difference between the 
mortgage rate and the yield on Confederation bonds, gross domestic product, consumer prices, the 
unemployment rate and the Swiss franc exchange rate of the D-mark (or euro as of 2000).  10 
supply immediately starts contracting.
4 The banks’ holdings of securities also promptly 
contract, whereas the decline in bank loans only sets in after about twelve months. At about 
the same time, the spread between the mortgage rate and the yield on Confederation bonds 
shows a statistically significant widening. This response is consistent with the existence of a 
credit channel.
5 
Another way of expanding the Bernanke-Blinder approach is to distinguish bank 
groups that can be assumed to react in different ways to a monetary policy shock. A separate 
VAR for each of these bank groups can then be estimated, and the impulse-response 
functions can be compared. Kashyap and Stein (1995) argue that small banks have more 
difficulties compensating for an outflow of deposits with funds from other sources. Small 
banks may therefore react more strongly than large banks in terms of cutting back their loan 
portfolio, but less strongly in terms of cutting back their securities portfolio. 
Steudler and Zurlinden (1998) have tested this prediction for Switzerland. Balance 
sheet figures for the individual banks would be the ideal basis for forming groups according 
to size. But these micro data are only available as of 1987. For the time before 1987, only 
semi-aggregated data for the traditional classification of big banks, cantonal banks and 
regional banks are available. The authors resort to this classification and combine the 
published data series for the period 1976-1987 with new series calculated on the basis of 
micro data for the period 1987-1996; from 1987 onwards, the time series are adjusted for 
the effects of mergers, takeovers and closures.
6  
For each of the three bank groups, Steudler and Zurlinden estimate a VAR model with 
quarterly data for five variables: real GDP, the 3-month Swiss franc interest rate, and three 
bank balance sheet items (deposits, loans and securities; each CPI-deflated). Although the 
implied impulse-response functions indicate that the securities of all three bank groups react 
to an interest rate shock faster than loans, the relative effects do not fall into the pattern that 
the hypothesis of Kashyap and Stein would have led us to expect. In particular, not only 
securities but also loans react more strongly at the big banks than at the cantonal or regional 
banks. 
These results are confirmed by VAR models with three variables which, in addition to 
real GDP and the 3-month Swiss franc interest rate, include a single balance sheet item 
(alternately deposits, loans and securities). Only when the VAR models are estimated using 
bank deposits in place of the interest rate, and only with bank loans split up into secured and 
unsecured loans, do the results look more favourable for the credit view. In this case, loans 
                                                 
4  Natal (2002, 2003) describes his results based on the example of an expansionary monetary policy shock. 
For the sake of simplicity, the results of all papers reviewed in this section are expressed as responses to a 
tightening of monetary policy. 
5  It is not possible to discriminate between the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel on the 
basis of the interest spread chosen. A widening of the interest spread between bank loans and government 
securities may be due to a deterioration in bank balance sheets or to a deterioration in companies’ balance 
sheets.  
6  The combination of the unadjusted data for 1976-1987 with the adjusted data for 1987-1996 can be 
justified on the grounds that structural change in the banking sector was much more intensive during the 
second period. 11 
of big banks respond relatively slowly to a deposit shock. At the same time, the relatively 
strong impact on big banks’ holdings of securities is still there. 
Perrez and Bichsel (2003) go one step further and use a panel approach to investigate 
the micro data on bank balance sheets available as of 1987. In this way, they avoid the 
efficiency losses that result from the formation of groups with varying degrees of 
heterogeneity. Moreover, they are able to examine the influence of characteristics other than 
the size of banks. They are primarily interested in the role played by the banks’ liquidity and 
capital. The prediction examined by the two authors is that the lending activities of less 
liquid and less capitalised banks respond more sensitively to monetary policy than that of 
more liquid and better capitalised banks. Under the assumption of a homogeneous reaction 
of loan demand across banks, such a pattern can be interpreted as evidence supporting the 
existence of a bank lending channel. 
Perrez and Bichsel present results for various specifications. In their basic equation, 
they regress loan growth on the change in the short-term interest rate (which serves as the 
indicator of monetary policy), on a bank-characterising variable (either liquidity or 
capitalisation), on GDP growth, on CPI inflation and on the interaction terms (GDP growth, 
inflation, and either liquidity or capitalisation; each weighted by the change in the short-
term interest rate). The main focus is on the coefficient of the bank-characterising variable 
(liquidity or capitalisation) weighted by the change in the short-term interest rate. The 
results show that the lending activity of poorly capitalised banks responds to a monetary 
policy tightening more strongly than that of better capitalised banks. Liquidity, however, 
does not influence the effect of monetary policy on bank lending. 
Perrez and Bichsel also produce results indicating that the evidence is not very robust. 
Estimates with the two-stage procedure proposed by Kashyap and Stein (2000), for 
example, do not yield any evidence that monetary policy influences the effect of liquidity or 
capitalisation on lending activity. They merely suggest that capitalisation itself has an effect 
on loan growth, while liquidity has not.  
Amstad and Kaufmann (2003) adopt an approach that differs from that of Perrez and 
Bichsel (2003) or Steudler and Zurlinden (1998). Whereas the latter examine whether a 
particular characteristic of a bank affects its reaction to monetary policy, Amstad and 
Kaufmann attempt to form bank groups whose lending activity reacts differently to a change 
in the interest rate, and then describe the characteristics of these banking groups. Moreover, 
the two authors research asymmetries of the credit reactions over time, allowing for the 
possibility that the bank lending channel might only be effective temporarily. 
The model calls for estimates of two latent variables: group affiliation, which assigns 
all banks as homogeneously as possible to groups according to their reaction to interest rate 
changes; and regime affiliation, which corresponds to the probability of the credit channel 
occurring. Both are estimated simultaneously: group affiliation on the basis of cluster 
analysis, and regime affiliation using a Markov-switching model. The quarterly data, which 
have been adjusted for bank mergers, cover the period 1989-2001. 
The estimates show that two bank groups can be distinguished. In only one of these 
groups does lending activity react to monetary policy actions. The banks in question are 12 
characterised by smaller size, lower liquidity and – above all – lower capitalisation than 
those that do not react. All three characteristics are consistent with the existence of a bank 
lending channel. Furthermore, the results suggest that the bank lending channel is open only 
temporarily. The periods in which it is open often coincide with recessions. 
All papers we have described so far are based on bank credit data. They shed light 
either on the credit channel in general (Natal) or on the bank lending channel specifically. 
By contrast, there is only one study on the balance sheet channel, namely that by Kalt 
(2001). Kalt’s study is based on confidential balance sheet and income statement data on 
over 5,000 corporate clients of a major Swiss bank. The data are annual and cover the 
period 1988-1997. They appear to be of very good quality since the balance sheet figures 
are adjusted for hidden reserves. 
Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), Kalt estimates a panel VAR with three 
variables – investment rate (growth in capital stock), marginal product of capital, and cash 
flow divided by capital stock. The implied impulse-response functions show that 
investments react to a one-standard-deviation cash flow shock with an oscillating pattern, 
and react positively on balance. The effects are slight, however. The significantly positive 
reaction of the investment rate is confined to a single period (2nd period after the shock) and 
is about five times weaker than with a productivity shock. 
Kalt then examines a number of other hypotheses, all derived from the credit view. He 
first divides the firms into two groups according to size in order to test the hypothesis that 
small firms have more difficulty obtaining external finance than large ones. Second, he 
classifies the firms according to the percentage of total assets accounted for by real estate in 
order to test the hypothesis that a firm's creditworthiness rises with the proportion of assets 
held as real estate. And third, he classifies the firms according to the external funds spread 
to explore the argument that firms with relatively high borrowing costs are more restricted 
in their investment behaviour. In all three cases, the difference in reactions is consistent with 
the balance sheet channel. 13 
4.  Concluding remarks 
The bulk of the empirical results summarised in this survey are consistent with the 
existence of a credit channel in Switzerland. The evidence is not overwhelming, however. 
As was to be expected, significant effects more readily appear when the impulse is relatively 
close to the lending or investment activity in question, i.e., when a deposit shock (Steudler 
and Zurlinden) or a cash flow shock (Kalt) is observed rather than a proper monetary policy 
action. Moreover, some of the results do not appear to be very robust (as pointed out by 
Perrez and Bichsel, for example). 
It must be borne in mind that the data series underlying the studies are relatively short. 
Only the studies by Natal and by Steudler and Zurlinden are based on data going back as far 
as the 1970s. The other studies use data which, in the main, only go back to the end of the 
1980s. It will therefore be interesting to see whether the results can be confirmed as more 
data become available. In this context, it is worth mentioning that, as of 2004, the SNB is 
expanding the range of interest rate statistics it gathers. In time, this will improve the 
options for constructing suitable interest rate spreads. 
Despite these reservations, the empirical results allow comparison with those of other 
countries. The international literature has grown considerably in recent years.
7 On the one 
hand, it shows that a strong case can be made for the existence of a balance sheet channel 
(see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999, for the United States; and Châtelain et al., 2001, 
for the large euro countries). The evidence presented by Kalt for Switzerland is thus 
consistent with that provided for other countries. On the other hand, there is less agreement 
with regard to the bank lending channel. Some studies also suggest that the factors causing 
the banks to react in different ways are not the same in all countries. In the US, small and 
poorly capitalised banks exhibit a disproportionately strong reaction to monetary policy 
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000). In the euro countries, however, the less liquid banks react more 
strongly than those with ample liquidity, whereas size and capitalisation have no effect 
(Ehrmann et al., 2003). According to the results presented by Perrez and Bichsel (single-
step approach) and by Amstad and Kaufmann, the Swiss bank lending channel therefore 
bears a closer resemblance to the US case. 
In line with the international literature, the empirical studies for Switzerland focus on 
the existence of a credit channel. The results thus do not say much about the quantitative 
importance of this channel. Also, a glance at the macroeconometric models used in most 
countries for economic forecasts suggests that recent literature on the credit channel has not 
yet substantially affected the way the economy is typically modelled. This reflects the 
widespread belief that models which disregard the refinements based on the modern credit 
view still provide adequate results in most circumstances. 
It is likely, however, that the credit view will increasingly have a bearing on micro-
based dynamic general equilibrium models. These models can be used to address specific 
                                                 
7  See Angeloni et al. (2003) for the results of a comprehensive research project completed jointly by the 
ECB and the central banks of the euro area. 14 
issues regarding the influence of the financing structure on macroeconomic variables. Early 
examples are Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001).  
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the benefits of the credit view extend beyond 
the issue of a credit channel for monetary policy. As mentioned at the outset, the 
information asymmetry between lender and borrower underlying the credit view is a 
prerequisite for the financing structure to play a macroeconomically relevant role. The credit 
view is thus important and useful in all discussions concerning the macroeconomic effects 
of changes in the financing structure (new capital adequacy rules, banking crises, etc.). 
Since the SNB’s mandate extends not only to macroeconomics (price stability) but also to 
the financial sector (stability of the financial system), it should be kept in mind that the 
credit view gives us the tools to analyse and discuss the interaction between these two tasks.
  15 
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